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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
RULON T. JEFFS and J. MARION 
HAMMON, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
VS. 
CITIZENS FINANCE COMPANY, 
a corporation 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case 
No. 8637 
Brief· of Plaintiffs and Respondents 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was commenced on the 8th day of September, 
1955, by the plaintiff-respondents, Rulon T. Jeffs and J. 
Marion Hammon, against the defendant-appellant, Citizens 
Finance Company, to quiet title to the premises referred to 
in the Uniform Real Estate Contract between Betsy Lee, as 
vendor, and Dale E. Watson and Laura Dean Watson, his 
wife, as purchasers. 
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The defendant-appellant filed an answer and counter-
claim and the matter came on for pre-trial conference, at which 
time the trial court fixed the 'matter of law to be considered 
at the trial. 
The tnatter was heard by the court on the 14th day of 
December, 1956, and the court ruled that plaintiff-respondents 
were entitled to an order quieting title to the premises, the 
defendant-appellant having failed to present any evidence. 
On the 4th day of January, 1957, judgment was duly 
entered in favor of the plaintiff-respondents, and thereafter, 
the defendant~appellant served and filed notice of appeal and 
the cause is now before the court for review. 
The action arose from certain transactions hereinafter 
briefly set forth. 
On the 9th day of June, 1952, Betsy Lee, a widO'\Y, by a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract, sold certain real property located 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to Dale E. Watson and 
Laura Dean Watson, his wife. 
On the 20th day of December, 1952, the Watsons assigned 
their equity in the contract to Citizens Finance Company, the 
defendant-appellant, for the purpose of securing a loan evi-
denced by a promissory note. The assignment '\\'as recorded on 
the 23rd day of December, 1952. 
On the 9th day of March, 195~, Betsy Lee assigned all 
her right, title and interest in and to the contract, and con-
veyed the real property by \\';.trranty deed to Rulon T. Jeffs, 
{ )ne of the plaintiff-respondents. 
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The Watsons, being delinquent in the payments due under 
the contract, were served with notice of forfeiture on the 28th 
day of May, 1954, and thereafter, on June 22, 1954, were 
served with notice to quit. On the 14th day of July, 1954, t'he 
plaintiff-respondent, Jeffs, filed an unlawful detainer action 
against the Watsons, and on the 20th day of August, 1954, 
judgment was entered against the W atsons, which judgment 
provided for the forfeiture of the Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract entered into on the 9th day of June, 1952, for writ of 
restitution, and for the sum of $5 50.00 accrued back pay-
ments. 
Thereafter, the property was repossessed by the plaintiff-
respondent, Jeffs, who subsequently, by warranty deed, con-
veyed the property to J. Marion Hammon, the other plaintiff-
respondent herein. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The defendant-appellant was afforded an opportunity 
by the trial court to assert its rights in and to the property, the 
subject matter of this litigation, and the defendant-appellant, 
by not offering evidence, refused to assert its rights and so 
waived any rights it may have had. 
2. A person not in possession of property, said property 
being the subject matter of an unlawful detainer action, is not 
entitled to notice of the action. 
3. The court is empowered to declare a forfeiture of a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract by judgment in an unlawful 
,) 
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detainer action if said contract is the agreement under which 
t'he property is being held by the defendant. 
4. The defendant-appellant, Citizens Finance Company, 
as assignee of the W atsons' interest, did not give sufficient 
notice of the assignment so as to put the vendor of the property, 
Betsy Lee, or her assignee, the plaintiff-respondent Jeffs, on 
the duty of notice of defendant-appellant's assignment. The 
iailure of the defendant-appellant to give notice constitutes 
an estoppel to assert a claim of lack of notice. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS AFFORDED 
AN OPPORTUNITY BY THE TRIAL COURT TO ASSERT 
ITS RIGHTS IN AND TO THE PROPERTY, THE SUB-
JECT MATTER OF THIS LITIGATION, AND THE DE-
FENDANT-APPELLANT, BY NOT OFFERING EVI-
DENCE, REFUSED TO ASSERT ITS RIGHTS AND SO 
WAIVED ANY RIGHTS IT MAY HAVE HAD. 
The trial court ruled that the defendant-appellant, Citizens 
Finance Company, was entitled to assert what claims it had 
as to the property in question and what issues it could have 
raised at the trial on the unlawful detainer action, had it been 
notified by the plaintiff-respondent, Jeffs, at the time of the 
~Let ion. 
nThe C~ourt: tSo this record n1ay state the full truth, 
I held as a n1atter of law the only issue to be tried here 
\\'aS ,,··hat this defendant could have raised at the 
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former trial had he been given notice and the only 
thing then he could have shown was whether or not 
there was an equity at that time in this property.' '' 
Record, pp. 32, 33, Lines 29 to 2 
The defendant-appellant was entitled to bring an action 
at any time against the plaintiff-respondents, Jeffs and Ham-
n1on, to have its equity in the property determined. Malmberg 
v. Baugh, 218 P. 975; Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446. The 
Utah Supreme Court, in Williams vs. Nelson, 237 P. 217, 
said: 
HAs a matter of course, in t'his jurisdiction the tenant 
may at any time institute an action in a court of equity 
to determine his rights to the premises in question." 
This case was cited with approval in the Utah case of 
Dunbar v. Hansen, 250 P. 982. Chief Justice Moffat, in the 
concuring opinion in Christy v. Guild, 121 P.2d 401, said: 
HI concur with the understanding that the unlawful 
detainer action does not cut off the right of the pur-
chaser to bring suit to have equities determined if he 
claims equities in his favor." 
As the assignee, the defendant-appellant could have 
brought this action. However, the defendant-appellant did not 
bring an action to have its equities, if any, determined. 
The plaintiff-respondents, Jeffs and Hammon, brought the 
action to quiet title under Section 78-40-1, Utah Code Anno, 
195 3, which provides: 
((Action to determine adverse claim to property-
Authorized.-An action may be brought by any person 
against another who claims an estate or interest in real 
property or an interest or claim to personal property 
.-
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adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such 
adverse claim." 
By bringing this action, plaintiff-respondents gave the 
defendant-appellant the opportunity to assert its claims, if any, 
and to show any equity that the Watsons may have had to the 
property. However, t'he defendant-appellant refused to go for-
'Hard and assert any equity that it might have had under the 
assignment of the real estate contract. 
The trial court ruled: 
( (At this time I have accorded the defendant the right 
to show what that equity was and if there was an equity 
there, or a lien thereon, and you refuse to go on and 
offer proof." 
Record, p. 33, Lines 3 to 6 
The defendant-appellant claims that it did not have suf-
ficent time or information to proceed, and that its rights had 
been denied. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure with regards 
to depositions and discovery, under Rules 26 through 3 7, 
inclusive, afforded the defendant-appellant ample procedural 
methods of eliciting all the information that it needed. The 
record discloses that the defendant-appellant never filed a 
motion for an extension of time within which to prepare its 
evidence, nor made any demands for discovery under the Rules 
of Civil Procedure. By defendant-appellant's failure to go 
forward and offer evidence as to its equity in the property, 
the trial court \vas justified in granting to the plaintiff-re-
~:pondents a judgrnent quieting title to the property. 
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POINT TWO 
A PERSON NOT IN POSSESSION OF PROPERTY, 
SAID PROPERTY BEING THE SUBJECT MATTER OF 
AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION, IS NOT EN-
TITLED TO NOTICE OF THE ACTION. 
Under the Utah law dealing with unlawful detainer 
actions, the statutes specifically provide that the only necessary 
party defendants to the action are the person or persons who 
are in possession of the property at the time of the commence-
ment of the action. 
UNo person other than the tenant of the premises, 
and subtenant if there is one in the actual operation 
of the premises w'hen the action is commenced, need 
be made a party defendant in the proceeding, . . . " 
Sec. 78-36-7, Utah Code Anno., 1953 
In cases where there is a real estate contract involved in 
the unlawful detainer action, this Court has held that: 
((In this jurisdiction, it appears to be the common 
practice, under such a contract" (real estate) ((as is 
here involved, to bring an unlawful detainer action 
against a defaulting vendee." 
Christy v. Guild, (1942) Utah 121 P.2d 401 
In Pacific Development Co. v. Stewart, 195 P.2d 748, 
the Supreme Court specifically held that an action of unlawful 
detainer was proper where the agreement under which the 
property was being conveyed was a ((Uniform Real Estate 
Contract.'' 
In the unlawful detainer action, the plaintiff-respondent, 
Jeffs, caused to be served upon the Watsons a notice of for-
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feiture and a notice to quit. (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3, File 
# 42450, Salt Lake City Court). These notices were sufficient 
under the laws of Utah and judgment was duly entered by the 
City Court. 
As the Utah law specifically holds that only those in pos-
session are entitled to notice, the plaintiff-respondents contend 
that under no theory was the defendant-appellant entitled to 
notice of this unlawful detainer action, but that if the defend-
ant-appellant were entitled to any notice, that the duty of 
giving such notice would have been that of the Watsons and 
not of the plaintiff-respondent, Jeffs. 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT IS EMPOWERED TO DECLARE A FOR-
FEITURE OF A UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
BY JUDGMENT IN AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER AC-
TION IF SAID CONTRACT IS THE AGREEMENT UNDER 
WHICH THE PROPERTY IS BEING HELD BY THE 
DEFENDANT. 
Under the Utah law dealing with unlawful detainer 
actions, the statutes specifically provide that the judgment 
rendered by the court n1ay declare the forfeiture of the agree-
rnent under which the person or persons in possession of the 
property rely for their right of possession. 
" ... and if the proceeding is for unla\\'ful detainer 
after neglect or failure to perfonn any condition or 
L'ovenant of the lease or agreen1ent under Y:hich the 
10 
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property is held, . . . the judgment shall also declare 
the forfeiture of such lease or agreement." 
Sec. 78-36-10, Utah Code Anno., 195 3 
The plaintiff-respondents contend that as the court is 
~pecifically empowered to declare a forfeiture of an agreement 
under which property is held, and that, as shown by Point 
Two of this brief, no notice need be given to any person or 
persons other than those who are in actual possession of the 
property, the Uniform Real Estate Contract entered into by 
the Watsons on the 9th day of June, 1952, was duly forfeited 
as provided for by the Utah statutes. 
The defendant-appellant, in its brief, contends t'hat the 
contract was not forfeited, because of the lack of notice to it. 
However, as hereinabove stated, it was not entitled to notice. 
POINT FOUR 
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, CITIZENS FINANCE 
COMPANY, AS ASSIGNEE OF THE W ATSONS' INTER-
EST, DID NOT GIVE SUFFICIENT NOTICE OF THE 
l\SSIGNMENT SO AS TO PUT THE VENDOR OF THE 
PROPERTY, BETSY LEE, OR HER ASSIGNEE, THE 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT JEFFS, ON THE DUTY OF 
NOTICE OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S ASSIGNMENT. 
THE FAILURE OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO 
GIVE NOTICE CONSTITUTES AN ESTOPPEL TO ASSERT 
A CLAIM OF LACK OF NOTICE. 
The defendant-respondent, Citizens Finance Company, 
assumed only the beneficial interest that the Watsons had in 
11 
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their contract. It did not assume any of the burdens and lia-
bilities. The purpose of the assignment was not to take over 
possession or to assume the payment of the monthly payments, 
but as security for the repayment of a loan made by it to the 
Watsons. 
c (This assignment is given for the purpose of secur-
ing prompt payment of a certain promissory note dated 
Dec. 20, 1952, executed by the undersigned in favor 
of Citizens Finance Co. in the sum of $1032.00." 
Assignment, Def's Ex. No. 2 
t (We took an assignment of their equity in a real 
estate contract covering a home they were purchasing 
at 1215 East 3 3rd South . . . We realize that our 
security is applicable only to the equity the Watsons 
had in the property.'' 
Letter, Citizens Finance Co. toR. T. Jeffs, dtd March 
5, 1955, PI's Ex. No. 5 
t c • • • we acted in good faith and took an assignment 
of beneficial interest in this contract.'' 
Letter, Citizens Finance to Cotro-Manes, dtd April 
9, 1955, PI's Ex. No. 4 
The defendant-appellant admits that it gave no notice of 
the assignn1ent between t'he Watsons and itself to the vendor, 
Betsy Lee, except by constructive notice by the recordation 
of the assigntnent. 
t (The Court: c • • • it is agreed now that no notice 
\vas ever given by this defendant of the assignment 
\V hich it had except such constructive notice as may 
ber, iven by the filing and recording of the same?' 
t • lvt r:. Parkinson: cy es.' " 
Record, P. 30~ lines 2 5 to 29 
)~ 
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The recording of the assignment was not valid and suffi-
cient notice to the vendor of the property. In 66 Corpus Juris 
1079, Vendor and Purchaser, Sec. 868, it is said: 
((Under general rules, unless notice of an assign-
ment by the purchaser is given the vendor he is not 
affected by it. The notice must be sufficient." 
Under the Utah statutes dealing with the assignment of 
a mortgage, the statutes hold that unless actual notice is given 
to the mortgagor, the recording of the assignment is not suffi-
cient notice to him. 
It follows that as Betsy Lee, the vendor of the property, 
did not have notice of the assignment, had she commenced 
the action for unlawful detainer against the Watsons herself, 
under no theory or practice of the law would she have had 
to give notice to the Citizens Finance Company. The general 
rule is that there must be actual notice of assignment to the 
vendor. The Citizens Finance Company, in becoming the as-
signee of ~he Watsons, assumed the position of the W atsons, 
and was subject to all the defenses and equities of the vendor, 
Betsy Lee. 
((An assignee of a non-negotiable chose in action 
ordinarily, however, acquires no greater right than was 
possessed by his assignor, but simply stands in the 
shoes of fhe latter." 
4 Am Jur 304, Assignments, Sec. 95 
. It is held that an assignee of a purchaser of 
real estate takes subject to all the rights of the vendor 
under the original contract of sale, including all de-
fenses thereto availabe to the vendor." 
55 Am Jur 836, Vendor and Purchaser, Sec 422 
1') ,_) 
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As the defendant-appellant, Citizens Finance Company, 
did not give actual notice to the vendor, Betsy Lee, it could 
not have enforced the contract against Betsy Lee. 
C<Ordinariy, the obligations arising out a contract 
are due only to those with whom it is made; a contract 
cannot be enforced by a person who is not a party to 
it or in privity with it." 
12 Am Jur 818, Contracts, Sec. 273 
(<It is frequently stated that in order to enable a 
person to enforce an obligation there must exist be-
tween him and the obligee what is known in law as 
privity.'' 
12 Am Jur 819, Contracts, Sec 273 
As the defendant-appellant, Citizens Finance Company, 
did not give notice of the assignment to Betsy Lee, there was 
no privity between them, and certainly no novation of the 
contract. It follows that as there was no privity between Gtizens 
Finance Company and Betsy Lee, there can be no privity be-
tween Citizens Finance Company and Betsy Lee's assignee, 
the plaintiff-respondent, Jeffs. 
The facts in this case show without doubt that fuere was 
privity between Betsy Lee and Rulon T. Jeffs, and likewise 
there was privity between Citizens Finance Company and the 
W atsons. The failure of the defendant-appellant, Gtizens 
Finance Company, to give notice to Betsy Lee of its assign-
i nent creates an estoppel between it and Betsy Lee, whereby 
the defendant-appellant is barred or estopped from asserting 
:1ny rights or equities against Betsy Lee. As there is privity 
hct\vccn Betsy Lee and the plaintiff-respondent. Jefis, the 
defendant-appellant, Citizens Finance Company, is estopped 
1-t 
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from asserting any claim against Jeffs on the same theory as it 
is estopped from asserting any claim against Betsy Lee. 
((It is also a well recognized rule that where an 
estoppel is operative as between the original parties 
to the transaction, it is aso effective as to their privies 
in contract . . . '' 
Marion Cortgage Co. v. Grennan, 143 So 761, 87 
ALR 1492 
((When a contract of sale has been assigned, the ven-
dor not being a party to the assignment, no duty 
devolves on the vendor to hunt up the assignee to 
tender performance; it is sufficient if performance 
is tendered to the original vendee; and it is the duty 
of the assignee to make a tender of the money and 
demand a deed at or within the time designated in the 
contract, if time is of the essense of the agreement, or 
within a reasonable period if time is not material, and, 
if assignee fails to do so, the vendor, who has once 
tendered performance to his vendee that has remained, 
unaccepted, may treat the contract as abandoned, so 
as to become entitled to have evidence of it removed 
from the public records as a cloud on title.'' Citing 1 
Warvell on Vendors ( 2d Ed.), Sec. 66, p. 83; Cor bus 
vs. Teed, 69 Ill. 205." 
Pierce & Stevenson v. Jones, 147 So. 842, 88 ALR 192 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff-respondents contend that the trial court 
ruled properly in permitting the defendant-appellant to assert 
what equities it 'had in the property at the time of the trial 
of the quiet title action. This ruling of the trial court is in 
conformity with the holding of the Supreme Court in the case 
15 
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of Christy v. Guild, and the earlier cases of Williams v. Nelson 
and Dunbar v. Hansen. The trial court's ruling is also in con-
forn1ity with the intent of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to 
eliminate needless litigation and to consolidate as many causes 
of action between the same parties in one trial as possible. 
The plaintiff-respondents contend, however, that the 
defendant-appellant was not entitled to any notice of t'he 
unlawful detainer action on two theories, first, that the un-
lawful detainer statutes as cited above in Point Two and Point 
Three exclude the necessity of notice to persons not in pos-
session; and, secondly, that the defendant-appellant's failure 
to provide notice to the vendor of its assignment establishes 
an estoppel whereby any assignee of the vendor is not charged 
with notice of the assignment regardless of the recordation. 
The plaintiff-respondents further contend that even if 
the defendant-appellant had been entitled to notice, t'hat as 
there was no privity of contract between it and the vendor, 
the defendant-appellant was not entitled to assert any of the 
rights under the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
Respectfully submitted, 
COTRO-MANES & COTRO-MANES, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Respondents 
16 
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